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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties were married

D'Alene, Idaho.

on June 22, 1977, in Coeur

One child was born as issue of the marriage,

Leslie Erin Inabnit, currently age 9. (R.l)
2.

Respondent worked in Appellant's business during most of

their marriage.

Her efforts

contributed

to the value of the

businesses and to Appellant's ability to earn income. (TR.89,9394)
3.

During the marriage, the parties acquired certain real

property

from JSB

contract.
The

The resale

contract

$17,000.

in Montana

provided

and

is referred
that

resold

it

to Collins

on

to as the Collins contract.

Collins

would

pay

approximately

$12,000 remained owing to the original seller, JSB, but

did not become due until JSB could furnish good title.

As of the

date of the trial, August 31, 1987, the title had still not been
cleared and the $12,000 was not due to JSB.
4.

(TR.75 & 77)

When the parties moved from Montana to Vernal, Utah, the

parties had

no assets

bankruptcy.

to speak of and

(TR.46, 48)

considered

for

All assets that the parties now have

have been maintained by payments from marital funds.
made good money for several years in Vernal.
5.

filing

The parties

(TR.48)

On December 15, 1986, a deposit of $17,320.86 was made

in an account

reflecting

the Collins payment.

Appellant stated a total of $12,000 went
(TR.59)
2

(TR.77)

Of this

into the car business.

6.

On January 26, 1987, $11,000 was withdrawn and investe

in the mobile home lot and car business. (TR.78)
Amended

Verified

Divorce Complaint

was

On the day th

filed, May 28, 1987

another $4,000 was withdrawn and on May 29, 1987, another $3,00
was withdrawn and both invested

in the car business and mobil

home lot. (TR.78-79)
7.
and

In March of 1987, the balance in one account was $7,52

on April

17, 1987, the

balance

in another

account

wai

$14,368.
8.

Respondent worked

in Vernal even after Appellant tol<

her that she no longer had to work because the mobile home lo1
was paying all of their expenses.
9.

In a property proposal

(TR.90,93)
Appellant

admitted

there was

$18,000 equity in the car business. (TR.84)
10.

During the marriage, the parties purchased a 1987 Dodge

which Appellant agreed to pay beginning June of 1987 in lieu of
additional child support. (TR.56)
11.

Respondent received about $9,500 inheritance, paid $950

in tithing, $1,700 on Appellant's
Appellant's

separate property, $1,300

on

share of taxes and the rest of the separate funds

generally went into the marriage.

(TR.96,98-100)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion

when

it

found the car business was worth $18,000 because, the Appellant
admitted there was $18,000 equity, Appellant commingled
has attempted to trace, Appellant
3

funds he

invested a recent $11,000 plus

4,000

plus

$3,000

into

the business, there was

good

will

ssociated with the business, and other factors the court weighed
n trying to balance the equities between the parties.
2.
ound

The trial court did not abuse its discretion

the $3700 past

xpense

like many

ppellant.

The

due on sales tax was a common

other

court

common

properly

expenses
refused

not

when it
business

discussed

to diminish

by

the car

usiness value by the sales tax amount.
3.

The trial

equired Appellant

court

did not abuse its discretion when it

to pay for the 1987 Dodge because

Appellant

ad agreed to pay and the court has "considerable discretion" in
djusting the equities and is not "rigidly bound to the rules of
1imony".
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE CAR
BUSINESS WAS WORTH $18,000 AND PROPERLY
AWARDED RESPONDENT ONE-HALF THAT VALUE.
Ttfe trial
etting
arties.
hat

values

court
and

is permitted
adjusting

the

considerable
financial

discretion in

equities

of

the

The court can consider commingling of monies, the fact

debts

are

not

due, the amount

of

money

available

in

ifferent accounts, the amount of labor and money invested into a
usiness, admissions of the parties and the parties' abilities to
arn income.
ee

v.

Lee,

See Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah 1987);
744

P.2d

1378

(Utah

lexander, 737 P.2d 221 (Utali 1987).
4

App. 1987);

Alexander

v.

In Petersen, the Supreme Court stated the rule:
Generally, the trial court is permitted considerable
discretion in adjusting the financial and property
interests of the parties to a divorce action, and its
determinations are entitled to a presumption of
validity. And although appellate courts may weigh the
evidence and substitute their judgment for that of the
trial court in divorce actions, as the Supreme Court
stated in Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982),
"this court will not do so lightly and merely because
its judgment may differ from that of the trial judge.
A trial court's apportionment of property will not be
disturbed unless it works such a manifest injustice or
inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion."
(Citations omitted)
In order to disturb a ruling regarding valuation of marital
assets and division of assets this court must find a "clear abus<
of discretion."

See Lee.

The district court found as follows:
The court finds that ... there is $18,000 equity in the
automobile business. That the-$12,000 [a debt owed to
JSB and not related to the car business] is not an
offset against that equity, that not being connected
with the car business.
The parties purchased some real estate sometime in 1977-1981
from JSB (TR.75), this property was resold to Collins.

Whe

Collins paid, $17,000 was deposited in the bank on December 15
1986.

On January 26, 1987# $11,000 from the same account wa

withdrawn and put into the car business and mobile home lot.
May 28, 1987, the same date the Amended Verified

0

Divorc

Complaint was filed, the Appellant withdrew another $4,000 whic
was put into the business.

Again on May 29, 1987, $3,000 wa

withdrawn and put into the car business.

In March of 1987 on

account had $7,528 and another $14,368.

Although there wer

enough funds around, none of these funds were used to pay off th
i

5

*bt

owing

to JSB

on the Collins

property

and

in fact

the

villaining balance on the property had not fallen due as the title
id not been cleared up.
The

funds

went

into

the

mobile

home

lot

and

the car

jsiness, yet the Appellant has argued that the entire debt be
^ducted
ries

only

to keep

from the equity

in the car business.

Appellant

separate

that

into

money

was

commingled

two

asinesses and not maintained separate and apart for payment of a
pecific debt.

Appellant has tried to pick and choose debts to

educt and pick and choose assets from which to deduct debts.
The court
uling.

had other

facts

upon which

it could

base

its

The court considered evidence before it of income from

he business, debts f
ppellant

assets,

receivables,

and Respondent, and

other

donated

factors.

work

The

by

Appellant

tated he made "good money" for several years in Vernal. (TR.48)
here was evidence that the mobile home park was meeting all of
he parties expenses and that Respondent did not have to work.
TR.91 & 93)
The Appellant
ill". (TR.42)

admitted

that

the car business

had

On a "property proposal", the Appellant

"good

admitted

hat he had $18,000 equity in the car business. (TR.84)

Appellant was able

to

make more

income

espondent had no skills in the car business*
ill of

the different

values, assets,

than

Respondent.

The court balanced

receivables,

debts,

ibilities to earn, and other factors brought out in the trial and
ashioned a fair and proper award which balanced the equities as
6

best the court ccuic.
be disturbed

Tne trial court's apportionment should nc

"unless

it works

such

a manifest

in3ustice c

inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion."
The Appellant should not be allowed to select one healt*
debt

unrelated

to the car business and argue that

This is especially so when t1

the value of the car business.
expense

it decrease

is not yet due because title to property has not be

cleared.
* n Alexander f the husband argued that the court should ha
decreased
account
future.
court's

the value of the husband's profit-sharing

for income tax liability that could
The court
valuation

discretion.

held
and

that

it would

the decision

was

be

plan

imposed

in t

not disturb the tri
within

the

court

The court cited Gilbert v. Gilbert, 628 P.2d If

(Mont. 1981) .
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER IN NOT DEDUCTING
THE AMOUNT OF PAST DUE SALES TAXES BECAUSE
THE DEBT WAS A COMMON BUSINESS EXPENSE.
The common business expense of sales taxes is more unrela
than the $12,000 debt to JSB discussed above.
apply.

The same argume

The sales tax expense should have no greater significa

to the judge than any other continuing business expense.
were

to continue with Appellant's

If

argument, we would have

allow a year <Sf business expenses allowed on Appellant's inc
tax return.

7

POINT

III

THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER IN AWARDING
PERMANENT ALIMONY AS A PART OF THE PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT.
The

court

arriage.

Although,

limony,
•roperty
tot

to

ordered

it

has

all

division.
terminate

ranscript

the
of

the
court
the

The c o u r t
the

Appellant

monthly

called

to

pay

this

markings

of

a

debt

payment
an

the

adjustment

specifically

considered

car

upon

payments

of

of

the
debt

in

whether

remarriage.

the
or
The

provides:

The p l a i n t i f f
i s awarded a l i m o n y in t h e amount of t h e
b a l a n c e d u e on t h e a u t o m o b i l e
contract,
which
apparently
is about twenty-eight
or
twenty-nine
p a y m e n t s of $ 2 0 0 . 4 2 e a c h .
....

MR. MCRAE:

Terminable on death or remarriage?

THE COURT: No. That is due on that automobile.
ordered as alimony to pay off that automobile.

He is

The court has broad discretion in fashioning a division of
property and alimony.

See Lord v. Shawy

682 P.2d 853 (Utah

L984); Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562 (Utah); Petersen, cited
above; Alexander, cited above.
In Petersen, the wife worked during husband's schooling in
order to put husband through school.

The court gave the wife an

award based upon her contribution, to the husband's advanced
degree.

The trial court characterized the husband's advanced

degree as property

instead of alimony

in order- to iavoid the

termination of an award upon the wife's xemarriage»
Tiie *court analyzed JAiff*erent approaches to awarding ,a spouse
a portion ^of thje yalue of an advanced degree and held that the

"criteria
cause

for an award of s u p p o r t

a harsh

"court

chose

result.
to

The Supreme Court

balance

the

to

rehabilitate

found

inequalities

p a r t l y w i t h t h e alimony a w a r d . "
a l i m o n y which did

in Utah a r e not so r i g i d " as t<
that

between

the
the

tria]
parties

The Court s u s t a i n e d a f i n d i n g

oi

not t e r m i n a t e upon r e m a r r i a g e and which workec
the

wife

or

reimburse

the

wife

for

hei

justified

its

contribution.
The

Supreme

Court

in

Petersen

further

decision:
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a
division of properties, it is a prerogative of the
[trial] court to make whatever disposition of property
as it deems fair, equitable, and necessary for the
protection and welfare of the parties, (p.242}
The court in Alexander , awarded no alimony, but ordered the
husband to pay the couple's outstanding debts in lieu of alimony.
Whether the court orders the husband to pay a debt and calls it
permanent alimony or whether the court orders the husband to pay
a debt and calls it part of the property division makes
difference.

little

The court is adjusting the "inequalities between the

parties.*

CONCLUSION

The "trial court

is allowed

considerable

discretion

in

fashioning out* support and a property division that fairly meets
the equities of the parties.

The trial court is present to view

and observe the demeanor Of f witnesses and to %e£t ^determine the
#

icts and the equities that must be adjusted.
The Respondent respectfully requests this Court uphold

the

*ard of the trial court.
Dated this 6th day of April, 1988.
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